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THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: A WEAK DEFENDER
AGAINST PANDEMICS

Chenglin Liu
Why did the World Health Organization(WHO) not act in a timely
fashion to declare the coronavirus outbreak a Public Health
Emergency of InternationalConcern (PHEIC)?If it had done so,
could the United States have heeded the warning and controlled
the spread of the virus? Is the WHO's delay afactual cause of the
calamities that the United States has suffered? This article
addresses these questions. PartI examines the development of the
WHO and its governance mechanism, major powers and limits,
andpast achievements andfailures. It also explores how the WHO
responded to the COVID-19 pandemic and what could have been
done-butwas not done-in the early stages. PartII analyzes why
the United States failed to effectively respond to the COVID-19
public health crisis. PartIII concludes that the WHO did not, and
in the future will not, have the power and courage to make a
prompt PHEIC declarationbecause of institutional constraints.
However; the WHO's delay in acting was not a factual cause of
the harm suffered in the United States because the Trump
Administration would not have acted differently even if the WHO
issued the PHEICwarning swiftly.
INTRODUCTION

Why

in a timely
Organization (WHO) not act
World Health
did the
fashion
to declare
the coronavirus outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)? If it had done so, could the
United States have heeded the warning and controlled the spread of the
virus? Is the WHO's delay a factual cause of the calamities that the United
States has suffered? This article addresses these questions. Part I examines
the development of the WHO and its governance mechanism, major powers and limits, and past achievements and failures. It also explores how
the WHO responded to the COVID-19 pandemic and what could have
been done-but was not done-in the early stages. Part II analyzes why
the United States failed to effectively respond to the COVID-19 public
health crisis. Part III concludes that the WHO did not, and in the future
will not, have the power and courage to make a prompt PHEIC declaration
because of institutional constraints. However, the WHO's delay in acting
was not a factual cause of the harm suffered in the United States because
the Trump Administration would not have acted differently even if the
WHO issued the PHEIC warning swiftly.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The InternationalSanitary Conferences
The establishment of the World Health Organization ("WHO") in
1946 was the culmination of 120 years of strenuous efforts to control and
eliminate infectious diseases that devastated European countries.' The
thriving international trade in the 19 century did not just produce wealth
for European countries, but also deadly pathogens. 2 In order to combat
infectious diseases while keeping the trade routes open, these countries
strived to harmonize various quarantine rules and took coordinated actions. 3 The early efforts to set up a framework for intergovernmental communications led to the first International Sanitary Conference ("ISC") in
1851.4 Even though the ISC did not produce any concrete results in the
first seven sessions, the forum played a vital role in bringing the member
countries together to exchange ideas about how best to combat the diseases. 5
During the early ISCs, member countries debated the divergent rules
on quarantine that were based on their contrasting views of disease transmission. 6 For example, the French, British, and Austrian delegates believed quarantine was ineffective for cholera because it was caused by
"atmospheric, climatic, and soil conditions" rather than physical contact
with an infected individual.7 On the other hand, the Italian delegates insisted that quarantine was the only way to prevent cholera.8 Spain was
more concerned that quarantine obstructed trades and caused economic
loss to the country. 9 Nevertheless, at the seventh ISC in 1892, members
finally agreed to create "an international treaty of very limited scope governing maritime quarantine regulations relating to cholera and only to
westbound shipping from the East." 10 At the 1893 Conference, the German delegation complained about the disastrous impact of maritime
1 NORMAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONFERENCES, 1851-1938, at 7 (1975),

https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/62873/14549_eng.pdf?sequence= 1&isAllowed=y.

Id. at 9.

2

3 See id.

4 Id.
5 Id. at 22 ("In the space of nine years, the first two International Sanitary
Conferences had involved a total of eleven months of fruitless discussions. Nevertheless, an important precedent had been set. In future years, an ever-increasing number of nations were to realize that an ever-increasing number of health
problems called for agreement at the international level."). See also id. at 9, 77.
6 Id. at 12.
Id.
8
Id. at 13.
9 Id. at 13-14 ("...time is money").
10
Id. at 65.
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quarantine measures on their trade and proposed to replace quarantine
with medical inspection." It serves as a vivid reminder that the delicate
balance between disease control and international trade advancement has
been in controversy for centuries during public health crises. In addition,
the members agreed to explore the possibility of establishing a notification
system by which members would be informed of cholera cases. 12
Another enduring legacy of the ISC was the creation of a permanent
office for coordinating international efforts for infectious disease control
and prevention.13 At the 11 th ISC, the French Government gained consensus among the member States for its proposal to establish the Office International d'Hygiene Publique ("OIHP") in 1907.14 In 1946, the WHO
incorporated the OIHP and other major international health institutions
within its governance structure. The ISC provided a template for the
world on how to take concerted efforts to protect public health while preserving international trade. The institutional structure that grew out of
these conferences laid a foundation for the WHO's development. While
the WHO owed its success to the ISC, it also inherited the forebearer's
fundamental weaknesses, including the lack of an enforcement system.
The Birth of the WHO
In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned the creation of
the United Nations ("UN") to maintain post-war order. 16 A few weeks after Roosevelt's death, the founding members-United States, China,
United Kingdom and Russia ("USSR")-invited 50 nations to attend the
San Francisco Conference on International Organization, at which the UN

Id. at 69.
"
12
Id. at 70.

13

Id. at 86.

14

Id.
Benjamin Mason Meier, Global Health Governance and the Contentious

15

Politicsof Human Rights: Mainstreamingthe Right to Healthfor Public Health

Advancement, 46 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2010). See also INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH CONFERENCE, SUMMARY REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS MINUTES AND

5 (June 1948), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstrearn/handle/10665/85573/Official record2 eng.pdfseciuence=1&isAllowed=y; Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention on
Global Health:A TransformativeAgendafor Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 21 n.73 (2013); Leonard J. Nelson, International
TravelRestrictions and the AIDS Epidemic, 81 AM. J. INT'LL. 230, 233 (1987);
Yanbai Andrea Wang, The Dynamism of Treaties, 78 MD. L. REV. 828, 857
(2019).
16 Office of the Historian: Bureau of Public Affairs, The United States and
the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941-October 1945 (Oct. 2005),
https://2001-2009. state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm.
FINAL ACTS
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Charter was signed.17 During the initial deliberation process, there was no
plan to create an international health organization. 1 8 However, the course
of history changed during a "medical lunch" attended by Dr. Szeming Sze,
an aid to the Chinese foreign minister, Dr. Karl Evang of Norway, and Dr.
Geraldo De Paula Souza of Brazil. 19 At this lunch, Dr. Sze proposed the
creation of a new health organization within the UN structure, which was
instantly supported by Dr. Evang and Dr. Paula Souza.2 0 Afterwards, Dr.
Sze drafted a declaration to hold an international health conference, ultimately leading to the creation of the WHO. Dr. Sze's declaration was
adopted during the San Francisco Conference after "vigorous intervention" from Chinese and Brazilian delegates. 2 1
The WHO Constitution"
From June to July of 1946, representatives from 61 countries attended
the first international health conference ("IHC") in New York, which
adopted the WHO Constitution.2 3 The Constitution set the basis for the
WHO to function as a special agency under the auspices of the UN.24
The WHO Constitution was enacted one year after the end of World
War II, which took up to sixty million lives. 25 The world's life expectancy
in 1950 was only 45.7 years. 26 Like the UN Charter, the WHO

The History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un
(last accessed Aug. 7, 2021).
1
17

8

Id.

Szeming Sze; World Health OrganizationCo-Founder,L.A. TIMES (Nov.
9, 1998), https://www.latimes.com/arclives/la-xpm-1998-nov-09-mn-41002story.html.
20
19

21

Id.
Id. See also WORLD

HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE BEGINNINGS OF
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, https://aps.who.int/iiis/bitstreaiu/han-

dle/10665/126402/194'7pdf.
22 Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 62 U.S.T.
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution].

23 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CONFERENCE: NEW YORK,

N.Y,

JUNE 19 TO JULY 22, 1946: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
INCLUDING THE FINAL ACT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS v (1947),

https://books.google.com/books?id=o4QN rEtM9MC&printsec=frontcover&so
urce=gbs_gesummaryr&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
24
Id. at 1.
25
John Graham Royde-Smith, World War I: Costs of the War, BRITANNICA
(May 15, 2021), htps://w
.britaicaco evenWorld-War-II/Costs-of-thewar.
26 Max Roser et al., Life Expectancy, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Oct. 2019),

httPs://ourworldintaor/life-expectancy#life-expectancyally.

s-improved-glob-
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Constitution strikes an uplifting tone setting the organization's goal as
"the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health." 28 It
declares that "[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction
of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition." 29 It defines health in the broadest terms as "a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." 30
To achieve these aspirational goals, the Constitution grants the WHO
a broad mandate, inter alia, to "act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work." 3 1 The Constitution sets forth the
governance structure of the WHO: The World Health Assembly (WHA) is
the highest level of decision-making body which consists of delegates
from Members.3 2 The Executive Board (Board) is responsible for carrying
out the WHA's decisions.3 3 On the nomination of the Board, the WHA
appoints the Director-General ("DG"), the public face of the WHO. 34
Members and the World Health Assembly (WHA)
As a special agency of the UN Economic and Social Council,35 the
WHO currently has 194 Member States. 36 Members of the UN may join
the WHO either by signing or accepting the WHO Constitution. Other
countries may be admitted to the WHO "when their application has been
approved by a simple majority vote of the Health Assembly." 38 In addition, the WHO may admit territories or groups of territories as Associate
Members. 39
27 Sandra Knispel, Has the World Health OrganizationMeasuredup?,
UNIV. OF ROCHESTER (May 22, 2019), hps://wwwrochester.edunnewscenter/has-the-world-health-organization-measured-up-3 81282/.
28 WHO Constitution, supra note 22, at art. 1.
29 Id. at pmbl.
30

Id.

31
32

Id. at art. 2(a).
_d.

Ch. V.

33 Id. at art. 28.
34 WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS: RULES OF PROCEDURES OF THE WORLD

HEALTH ASSEMBLY 173 (49th ed. 2020),
https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdffiles/BD_49th-en.pdf.
35 U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, SYSTEM,

ttps://,vww.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/-odf/ecosoc
2021).

chart.pdf (last visited June 19,

36 WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS: MEMBERS OF THE WORLD HEALTH

ORGANIZATION, annex 1 at 227 (49th ed. 2020),
https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/pdf_files/BD_49th-en.pdf.
37 WHO Constitution, supra note 22, at art. 4.
38 Id. at art. 6.
39 Id. at art. 8.
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The WHA is "the supreme decision-making body" of the WHO. 40 It
is composed of delegates from Members, 41 each of whom is entitled to
send no more than three delegates to the WHA. 4 2 In addition to meeting
in regular annual sessions, the WHA conducts special sessions upon the
request of either the Board or a majority of the Members. 43 The WH-A
plays a key role in the WHO governance.
Internally, the WHA appoints the DG and the Board members and determines the policies of the WHO. 44 Furthermore, the WHA has the power
to review and approve reports, the activities of the Board and the DG,4 5
and supervise the WHO's annual budget and financial policies. 46 More
importantly, the WHA is the legislative body of the WHO. It has the authority to adopt conventions or agreements by a two-third vote. 47 In addition, it has the authority to adopt regulations concerning requirements for
sanitation and quarantining, nomenclature of diseases, standards for diagnostic procedures, and standards for the safety, purity, and potency of biological and pharmaceutical products. 4 8
Externally, the WHA has a wide range of powers and responsibilities.
For example, the WHA can instruct the Board and DG to communicate
important health-related matters with Members, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. 4 9 It also considers recommendations on health policies from the UN General Assembly, the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC), and other international organizations.50 In
addition, it reports the work of the WHO to the ECOSOC pursuant to any
agreements between the UN and the WHO.5 1
Executive Board
As the executive organ of the WHO, the Board is responsible for carrying out the WHA's decisions and policies.52 Based on equitable geographical distribution, the WHA selects 34 members, each of which is entitled to designate a qualified person to serve on the Board for a term of

40

WHO, Governance, httvs://www.who.int/about/govenance

June 19 2021).
41
42

WHO Constitution, supra note 22, at art. 10.

Id. at art. 11.

Id. at art.
Id. at art.
Id. at art.
46
Id. at art.
47
Id. at art.
48
Id. at art.
49
Id. at art.
50 Id. at art.
43

44
45

51
52

13.
18(a)-(c).
18(d).
18(f).
19.
21.
18(g).
18(i).

Id. at art. 18(j).
Id. at art. 28.

(last visited

The World Health Organization

2021 ]

181

three years with the possibility of renewal. 5 3 Currently, eight Board members are from Europe, seven from Africa, six from the Americas, five from
the Western Pacific, five from the Eastern Mediterranean, and three from
South-East Asia.54 The Board meets twice a year and follows its own rules
of procedures.5 5 The major functions of the Board include advising the
WHA, making proposals to the WHA, and preparing the agenda for the
WHA. 56 Most importantly, the Constitution authorizes the Board to "take
emergency measures within the functions and financial resources of the
[WHO] to deal with events requiring immediate action."5 It also requires
the DG and Board to coordinate in creating measures to combat epidemics, provide relief, and conduct research. 58
The Director ("DG") and the Secretariat
The DG and the technical and administrative staff form an important
branch of the WHO governance called the Secretariat. 59 The Constitution
mandates that the DG and the staff work for the WHO, independent from
influences of their home countries.
In the performance of their duties the Director-General
and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from
any government or from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which
might reflect on their position as international officers.
Each Member of the Organization on its part undertakes
to respect the exclusively international character of the
Director-General and the staff and not to seek to influence

them. 60
The Constitution grants the DG the title of chief technical and administrative officer of the WHO with limited powers. These limited powers
include drafting the financial statement and budget estimates of the
WHO, 6 1 proposing the establishment of committees as he or she deems
necessary,62or appearing in court on behalf of the WHO. 63 In practice,
however, the DG is the most influential position in the WHO's

53 Id. at art. 24-25.
5 WHO, Composition of the Board, https://apps.who.int/gb/gov/en/compo-

sition-of-the-board_en.html (last visited June 19, 2021).
5 Id. at arts. 26-27.
56 Id. at art. 28
5 Id. at art. 28(i).
58 Id.

59 Id. at art. 30.
60

Id. at art. 37.

61
62

Id. at art. 34.
Id. at art. 38.
Id. at art. 77.

63
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governance. 64 In addition to shaping agenda and directing resources, the
DG also has access to the UN Secretary General, heads of states, prominent politicians, and business leaders across the world. 65 During pandemics, the DG commands public attention by promulgating the protocols for
diagnosis, treatment, quarantine and isolation, social distancing guidelines, and travel restrictions. 66
The DG is appointed by the WHA upon the Board's nomination for a
renewable three-year term. 6 7 While the heated competition for the DG position rarely appears in the news headlines, the nomination process can be
highly political. 68 Such a process is fraught with political maneuvering,
horse trading, and corruption. 69 For example, during the reelection of Dr.
Hiroshi Nakajima as the head of the WHO in 1992, the United States Department of State accused the Japanese government of threating to "cut
off fish imports from the Maldives and coffee imports from Jamaica if
those countries did not support Dr. Nakajima." 70 Laurie Garrett vividly
recounted how Japanese diplomats attempted to bribe an African delegate
for her vote for Dr. Nakajima. The African delegate burst out of the conference room and shouted, "You think you can buy my vote with a rug?
Do you think I am that cheap?"7 1
In May 2017, the WHA chose Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus over
the other finalists.72 Significantly, Dr. Tedros became the first non-physician to lead the WHO in its 72-year history.7 3 Dr. Tedros received a Doctorate of Philosophy ("Ph.D.") in Community Health from the University

64 Pien Huang, Explainer: What Does the
World Health OrganizationDo?,
NPR, (Apr. 28, 2020), htps://www.npror sections/goatsancb
soda/2020/04/28/847453237/what-is-who-and-what-does-it-do.
65 Id.

66 Id.

67 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS 9-10 ( 4 9 th ed.
2020) (citing WHO Constitution, supra note 22, at arts. 31-37).
68 The CandidatesRunning for WHO Director General,
BRIT. MED. J.,

https://www.bmj.com/who-dg (last visited June 26, 2021).
69 Laurie Garrett, Secret Vote on WHO Bodes Illfor Future of Global
Health, HUMANOSPHERE (May 23, 2016), htt-s://wwwhunano-

sphere~org/word-politics/20

global-health/.
70

Douglas Martin, Hiroshi Nakajima, Leader of WH.O., Dies at 84, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/asia/hiroshinakajima-leader-of-world-health-organization-dies-at-84.html?_r-0.
71 Garrett, supra note 69.
72 Id. (the other candidates' biographical information).
73 Stephanie Nebehay, Dr Tedros: The WHO Chief Leading the Fight
Against the Pandemic, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-who-tedros/dr-tedros-the-who-chief-leading-the-fightagainst-the-pandemic-idUSKBN20Z 1WP.
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of Nottingham, UK.7 4 Before assuming the WHO's leadership role, Dr.
Tedros was a career politician serving in Ethiopia's government as Minister of Health and Minister of Foreign Affairs for a decade. 75 "Dr. Tedros's
time as health minister the government failed to honestly and openly report several cholera outbreaks, despite United Nations confirmation of the
disease."76
According to the job qualifications for the DG position, medical training is not specifically required. 77 The criteria reflects that the WHO expects the DG to be a polished communicator, manager, and diplomat.
However, there is not an emphasis on characteristics usually required of
public officials in democratic countries, such as integrity, honesty, trustworthiness, and accountability. Thus, like other international organizations, the WHO suffers from a democratic deficit.7 8 Some argue that the
DG is accountable to the 194 Members of the WHO while others maintain
that the DG is directly responsible to the seven billion people of the WHO
member countries. 7 9 In fact, the DG has no obligation to report its work
7 Biography: Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO,
https://www.who.int/director-general/biography (last visited June 26, 2021).
7 Id.
76 Lawrence O. Gostin, The World Health Organization'sNinth DirectorGeneral: The Leadership of TedrosAdhanom, 95 MILBANK Q. 45, 459 (2017).
77 World Health Organization 65th WH.A Res. 65.15, at 23-25 (May 2012)
(describing the qualifications of the DG: (1) A strong technical background in a
health field, including experience in public health (2) Exposure to, and extensive experience in, international health; (3) Demonstrable leadership skills and
experience (4)Excellent communication and advocacy skills; (5) Demonstrable
competence in organizational management; (6)Sensitivity to cultural, social, and
political differences; (7)Strong commitment to the mission and objectives of
WHO; (8)Good health conditions required of all staff members of the organization; (9) Sufficient skill in at least one of the official working languages of the
Executive Board and the Health Assembly).
78 Upasana Singh, The Role ofRule of Law in Democratizationof the World
Health Organization, https://www.iuscommune.eu/html/activities/2020/202011-26/workshop_5b_Singh.pdf (last visited June 26, 2021). See also Andrew
Moravcsik, Is there a 'DemocraticDeficit'in World Politics?A Frameworkfor
Analysis, in GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 337, 338 (2004),
https:// v;.rinceton.edt /amoravcs/library/framework.pdf; Klaus Dingwerth,
Global Democracy and the DemocraticMinimum: Why a ProceduralAccount
Alone is Insufficient, 20 EUR. J. OF INT'L RELS. 1124, 1127 (2014); Kim R.
Holmes, Asst. Sec. for Int'l Org. Affairs, Democracy and International Organizations, Remarks to the World Federalist Association and Oxfam (Dec. 5, 2003);
Eugenia C. Heldt & Henning Schmidtke, Global Democracy in Decline? How
Rising AuthoritarianismLimits Democratic Control over InternationalInstitutions, 25 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 231, 254 (2019); Magdalena Bexell et al., Democracy in Global Governance: The Promisesand Pitfalls of TransnationalActors, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 81, 101 (2010).
79 Ilona Kickbusch et al., How to Choose the World's Top Health Diplomat,
355 BRIT. MED. J. (2016).
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to the people of the world even though their decisions have serious impacts on global health. On the surface, the DG is elected by the 194 Members, however, many of these Members are under no obligation to explain
their decision to their people. Furthermore, the 194 WHO Members vote
in secret, thus the opaque system makes it even more difficult for the public to know their governments' position on the DG selection process. The
lack of transparency is one of the fundamental flaws that place the legitimacy and credibility of the WHO in question. Without accountability,
communication skills mean nothing if the DG does not have the courage
to tell the truth to the world.
The Budget
The WHO's budget in 2021 is $5.84 billion, 80 which accounts for
0.365% of the United States Department of Health and Human Services'
annual budget of $1.6 trillion. 8 1 In comparison, the Texas Health Department operates on an $87 billion annual budget, 14 times that of the
WHO. 82 Even Rhode Island, the smallest state in the U.S., 83 spends $4.2
billion on health. 84 Despite its ambition to defend the global health, the
WHO can only afford to spend 75# annually on each of 7.8 billion people
in the world.85
The WHO's meager budget derives from two sources: (1) assessed
contributions that are mandatory membership fees based on each country's Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") and population. The WHA

80 World Health Organization, Budget, WHO https://www.who.int/about/accountability/budget (last visited June 26, 2021).
81
HHS FY 2022 Budget in Brief, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2022/index.html (last visited June 26,
2021).
82 Eli Kirshbaum, Health Funding in Texas's Developing FY 2022-2023
Budget, STATE OF REFORM (May 4, 2021), https://stateofrefonncom/fea-

tured/202 1/05/health-fnding-in-texass-developing-fy-2022-2023-budget/. California health budget is $26 billion. The 2019-20 Budget: CaliforniaSpending
Plan-Healthand Human Services (HHS)-SpendingPlan, LAO (Oct. 17, 2019),
htps://laocA. gov/Publications/Report/4104. Florida spends $37 billion on
health. Governor 's2020-2021 ProposedState Budget, FLA. ASS'N OF CNTYS.
(Nov. 18, 2019), hps://svww.fl-counties.com/goverors-2020-2021-proposedstate-budget.
83 Fun Facts & Trivia, R.I., https://www.ri.gov/facts/trivia.php (last visited
June 26, 2021).
84 FiscalYear 2021 Budget Proposal, R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.omb.i.gov/documents/Prior%2OYear%2OBudgets/Operating%20Budget%202021/BudgetVolumeII/0_Complete%20 Volume%20II%20%20Health%20and%20Human%20Services.pdf (last visited June 26, 2021).
85 Current World Population, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ (last visited June 26, 2021).
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approves the amounts that each member must pay. 86 The assessed contributions account for 20% of the WHO's budget. 87 In the past decade, the
United States has paid an average of $110 million each year, making up
for one fifth of all member state assessed contributions;8 8 (2) voluntary
contributions account for nearly 80% of the WHO's total budget, 89 which
are donated by member states and WHO's partners. 90 Through various accounts, 91 the United States made $300 million in voluntary contributions
in 2019.92 In addition to the U.S. government, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation plays a crucial role in funding the WHO through voluntary
contribution. The Foundation contributed to 13% of the WHO's total
budget during the 2016-2017 period. 93 After President Trump threatened
to halt the U.S. government funding to the WHO, the Gates Foundation
increased its pledge to the WHO from $100 million to $250 million in
2020.94
Depending on whether the donors set restrictions on spending, the voluntary contributions can be subdivided into three categories: 95 (a) Core
voluntary contributions ("CVC") make up 3.9% of all voluntary contributions. Donors of CVC give the WHO full discretion on how the donations

86

How WHO is Funded, WHO, https://www.who.int/about/funding (last
visited June 26, 2021).
87 Id.
88 The U.S. Government and the World Health Organization,KAISER FAM.
FOUND., (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.kfforg/coronavirus-covid-19/fact-

sheet/thc-u-s~gvmnent-and-the-world-health-organization/.
89

Id. at Figure 2.

How WHO is Funded, supra note 86.
& TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IN11369, U.S. FUNDING TO THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 2 (Apr. 30,
2020), https://fas.or /sgp/crs/row/IN11369.pdf ("The United States provides
voluntary contributions to WHO for specific activities through several accounts,
including USAID's Global Health Programs and International Disaster Assistance accounts, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)/Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention's Global Health account, and the State Department's Migration and Refugees account. Congress appropriates overall
funding for each of these accounts, while the executive branch determines how
the funds are allocated based on global health needs and U.S. policy priorities.
In recent years, the majority of funding has been allocated through USAID and
HHS-related accounts for activities focused on infectious disease control, malaria control, and emergency response, among others.").
92 The U.S. Government and the World Health Organization, supra note 88,
at Figure 2.
93 Deidre McPhillips, Gates Foundation Donationsto WHO Nearly Match
Those From U.S. Government, USNEws (May 29, 2020), https://wwwusnews. corn/news/articles/2020-05-29/gates-foundation-donations-to-who-nearlv
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are used for its programs. However, only very limited number of donors
are willing to provide the WHO with free rein on how to use the funds. 96
(b) Thematic and strategic engagement funds ("TSEF") represent 6% of
total voluntary contributions. Donors of TSEF provide the WHO with
some degree of flexibility in allocating the funds. After meeting the donors' requirement for reporting and accountability, the WHO has discretion in choosing effective and efficient means to carry out the donors' priorities. 97 (c) Specified voluntary contributions ("SVC") are tightly
earmarked funds, which account for 90.10% of the total voluntary contributions. The WHO must use the funds within the designated programmatic or geographical locations and within designated the time frames. 98
MajorAchievements
Despite budget constraints and lack of enforcement power, some of
the WHO's achievements on disease prevention and control are remarkable. Its most notable success is the eradication of Smallpox, a devastating
viral disease that had been inflicting enormous pain and sufferings for at
least 3,000 years. 99 In the 2 0 th century alone, approximately 300 million
people died of Smallpox. 100 In 1959, the WHO launched a campaign for
the eradication of smallpox in the world. 101 Due to lack of funds, personnel, and sufficient vaccine doses, the WHO failed to achieve the ambitious
goal.10 2 In 1967, the WHO resumed the eradiation campaign by focusing
on disease surveillance, nonmedical intervention, and vaccination. 1 0 3 Its
strenuous pursuit of the virus for more than two decades finally paid off.
On May 8, 1980, the WHO declared that Smallpox was successfully eradicated. 104
In addition, the WHO's continuous efforts to provide treatment of less
known communicable diseases have saved lives and improve life quality.1 0 5 For example, the WHO has made progress in treating Tuberculous
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99 Commemorating Smallpox Eradication-A Legacy of Hope, for COVID19 and other Diseases,
News Release, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (May 8, 2020),

https://xww.who.int/newsiten/8-05-2020-commemloratin g-s a1ox-eradication-a-le acv-of-ho efor-covid- 1 9-and-other-diseases.
Id.
101 History of Smallpox, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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(TB), often known as a silent killer.10 6 Coordinating with member countries and partners, the WHO extended TB care to 14 million people in
2018 and 2019.107
Equally important, the WHO has acted as an indispensable leader in
global health through exercising its unique power in "shar[ing] data between countries including standards, guidelines, and key health information." 10 8 Based on the idea of using national institutions for international purposes, the WHO has designated more than 800 Collaborating
Centers in over 80 countries. 10 9 These centers focusing on a wide range of
health issues: nursing, occupational health, communicable diseases, nutrition, mental health, chronic diseases and health technologies. 110 "There
are 8,106 (plus 1,927 consultants and 3,606 special service agreements)
working for WHO around the world; many of these are US nationals."1 11
Through the Collaborating Centers, the WHO "is able exercise leadership
in shaping the international health agenda." 1 1 2 In return, the countries that
host these centers can also provide expertise to the WHO and shape its
decision making processes. There are 82 WHO Collaborating Centers in
the United States, 21 of which are at the CDC. For example, the CDC's
World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Center for Surveillance,
Epidemiology and Control of Influenza plays a crucial role in pandemic
prevention.)3

106 Jezza Neumann & Rebecca Stewart, TB Silent Killer Frontline
S2014
Ep]7 (Mar. 25, 2014) (transcript on file with PBS),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/tb-silent-killer/transcript/.
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108 Devi Sridhar & Lois King, US Decision to Pull Out of World Health Organization, 370 BRIT. MED. J. (2020), https://www.bmi.com/content/370/bmi.m2943.
109 CollaboratingCentres, WHO, httvs://www.who.int/about/partnerships/collaborating-centres.
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CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/who-collaboration.tm (last reviewed Dec. 6, 2019).

Virginia Journalof SocialPolicy & the Law

188

[Vol. 28:2

The InternationalHealth Regulations
The Constitution authorizes the WHA to regulate various important
issues on global health matters.11 4 State Parties are given ample opportunities to transform the WHO regulations into domestic legal systems.115
While issuing regulations, the WHO notifies Members of a time frame in
which they can object or make reservations to the regulations. If Members
do not respond to the WHO's notice, the regulations take effect automatically.1 1 6 For Members who have made reservations, the regulations may
still become effective if the reservations do not conflict with the overall
purpose of the regulations.11 7 For Members who have timely made reservations, the regulations could still come into effect if the reservations do
not conflict with the overall purpose of the regulations. 1 8 Unfortunately,
the WHO has not fully utilized such powerful authorization. During its
75-year history, it has issued only a few regulations, including the International Health Regulations ("IHR").
In 1969, the Assembly adopted the IHR to replace the International
Sanitary Regulations of 1951.119 Initially, the 1969 IHR covered six "quarantinable diseases," but the scope of the coverage was reduced to only
three diseases: cholera, plague, and yellow fever.120 Under the 1969 IHR,
WHO Constitution, supra note 22, at art. XXI. (a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international
spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death
and public health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures
for international use; (d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency
of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce; (e) advertising and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar
products moving in international commerce.
115 Emergencies: Ten Things you need to do to Implement the International
Health Regulations, WHO (May 26, 2014), https://www.who.int/news-room/g114

a-detail/emergencies-ten-things-you-need-to-do-o-implement-tllc-ntemationalhealth-regulations ("An adequate legal framework to support and enable all of
the varied IHR State Party activities is needed in each country. In some countries, giving effect to the IHR within domestic jurisdiction and national law requires that the relevant authorities adopt implementing legislation for some or
all of the relevant rights and obligations for States Parties . . .. States Parties to
the IHR should consider assessing their relevant existing legislation to determine whether they may be appropriate for revision in order to facilitate full and
efficient implementation of the Regulations.").
116 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS 7 ( 4 9 th ed.

2020)

(citing WHO Constitution, supra note 22, at art. XXII).
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129 PUBLIC HEALTH 854, 856 (2015).
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if one of the listed diseases occurred, Members were obligated to notify
the WHO.
The 2005 IHR
The purpose of the IHR is to "prevent, protect against, control and
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease."1 21
To fulfill this purpose, the IHR calls for a balanced approach to address
the tension between disease control and international trade. Thus, disease
control measures should be commensurate with the public risks posted by
the spread of disease as to "avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade." 122
The guiding principle for implementing the IHR is to respect "the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedom of persons"12 3 and to protect
"all people ofthe world from the international spread of disease." 124 While
member countries have the sovereign rights to enact public health laws,
they should abide by the principles of international law, specifically the
UN Charter while implementing their regulations.12 5
National IHR FocalPoints
The SARS epidemic exposed the serious flaws in the IHR and
prompted the WHO to revisit its approach to international health emergencies. 126 "When WHO needed to reach the global community to alert it
to the emergence of SARS, it needed to hold a press conference on a Saturday morning. No mechanism was in place for communicating with
member States in a timely fashion." 12 7
To avoid information blockage, the revised IHR instituted both IHR
Focal Points in each State Party and WHO IHR Contact Point ("WCP")
in each of the six WHO's regional offices. The purpose was to provide an
additional channel for the WHO to monitor outbreaks of diseases and have
State Parties implement the IHR in real time. Being fully sensitive to national sovereignty concerns, the IHR require each State Party either to
designate an existing office as a National IHR Focal Point ("NFP") or to
establish an office for the same purpose. NFPs are by no means WHO's
field offices or embassies in member countries. Instead, they are points of
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communication for the WHO to interact with State Parties in real time,
especially during crises. "Many NFPs either are not well trained in IHR
implementation or-more often-are not properly tasked to routinely
communicate with WHO headquarters" 128 In addition, since the NFPs are
an integral part of the host countries' government apparatuses, they are
unlikely to act independently and provide objective and accurate information to the WHO when the national interests conflict with those of the
global health.
Surveillance
The IHR require State Parties to "develop, strengthen and maintain"
core capacities to "detect, access, notify and report events no later than
five years after the regulations take effect on June 15, 2007."129
A public international law usually sets a general goal and allows countries to choose suitable means to achieve the mandates."o The IHR, however, take a hands-on approach in terms of mapping out what State Parties
must accomplish to comply with these regulations. The Annex not only
enumerates core capacities that State Parties must have, but it also provides detailed guidelines for each of the three levels of heath administrations to follow.
At the local community level, the IHR demands medical workers or
institutions have the capacity to "detect events involving disease or death
above levels for the particular time and place in all areas within the territory of the State Party." 1 31 Then, the medical workers or institutions
should immediately "report all available essential information" to
healthcare officials at the next level or to the national health authorities.13 2
The essential information includes "clinical descriptions, laboratory results, sources and type of risk, numbers of human cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health measures employed." 13 3 Upon finding the event, the medical workers or institutions
must have the capacity to take "preliminary control measures immediately." 134

Gostin & Katz, supra note 119, at 270.
International Health Regulations, supra note 121, at art. 5.
130 The European Union uses directives to lay down certain results
that must
be achieved but each Member State is free to decide how to transpose directives
into national laws. Difference Between a Regulation, Directive and Decision,
U.S. MISSION TO THE EUR. UNION, https://www.usda-eu.org/eu-basics-questions/difference-between-a-regulation-directive-and-decision/ (last modified
Dec. 21, 2016).
131 International Health Regulations, supra note 121, at annex
1, art. 4.
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The health administration must have the capacity to confirm the status
of the events reported from the local level or to take additional control
measures to prevent the spread of the disease. Furthermore, the health administration must have the capacity to promptly evaluate the reported
events. If it is deemed urgent, the local-level health administration must
make a report to the national health administration. The report must specify the serious health impacts and/or unusual or unexpected nature of the
disease's high potential for spread.135
Upon receiving the reports from the lower levels, the national health
administration must have the capacity to evaluate the reported events
within 48 hours. 136 The IHR provides a four-factor test for the national
health administration to analyze the situation and decide whether to make
a report to the WHO immediately:
Is the public heath impact of the event serious?
Is the event unusual or unexpected?
Is there a significant risk of international spread?
Is there a significant risk of international travel or trade
restrictions?
As the following illustration shows,1 37 when the national health administration determines that the event meets any of the four factors (the
decision instrument), it must report the event to the NFP within 24 hours
"through the most efficient means of communication."138 Essentially, the
IHR entrusts the national health administration with making a preliminary
assessment whether the reported event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern ("PHEIC"). 139 Although the national
health administration does not have the authority to declare a PHEIC, the
first hand materials it provides would facilitate accurate evaluation of the
event by the WHO.
In fact, the IHR innocently assumes that the national health administration will timely provide the WHO with "all relevant public health information." 140 The information includes "case definitions, laboratory results, source and type of the risk, number of cases and deaths, [and]
conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health measures employed; and report." 14 1 In addition, the IHR anticipates that there are situations where the national health administration may face challenges in
controlling the spread of the public health emergency. Therefore, the IHR
135

Id. at annex 1, art. 5.

136

Id.

137

Id. at annex 2.
Id. at art. 6.

138

139 Id.
141
141

Id. at art. 7.
Id. at art. 6 (2).

Virginia Journalof SocialPolicy & the Law

192

[Vol. 28.2

requires the State Parties to report its difficulties so that the WHO can
timely provide support. 142 The IHR expects the national health administration to provide the WHO with evidence of the impact of the event. In
addition, the IHR encourages State Parties to communicate with the WHO
even if there is insufficient information to meet any factor of the fourfactor test. State Parties may also seek the WHO's assistance in dealing
with an event that occurred in its territory. 14 3

142
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By designing the reporting mechanism, the IHR drafters assumed the
State Parties would provide the WHO with prompt, accurate and complete
information about the public health emergencies occurring within their
territories. However, the drafters also anticipated that some State Parties
may not be willing to report public health emergencies to the WHO for
fear of trade and travel embargos by other countries resulting from negative publicity. As a result, the drafters designed another channel for the
WHO to gather necessary information even if State Parties refused to fulfil
their duty to report. Under the title of "Other Reports," the IHR include
sources other than official notifications or consultations made by the State
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Party. 144 Once the WHO obtains the unofficial information about the occurrence of a PHEIC, it proactively contacts the State Party requesting it
to verify whether a PHEIC indeed occurred. 145 The State Party is obligated
to respond to the WHO's verification request within twenty-four hours. 14 6
In its response, the State Party must provide "available public health information on the status of events referred to in WHO's request" and a preliminary assessment of whether the event referred to in the unofficial report could constitute a PHEIC. 147 Through this innovative provision, the
IHR opened the door to collect information from non-state actors such as
medical workers, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), and even
the general public. The provision makes it difficult for State Parties to hide
valuable information regarding public health emergencies. It will play an
increasingly important role in collecting information about PHEICs in the
age of social media. Nevertheless, the authoritarian regimes can still bypass this provision by censoring social media, punishing whistleblowers,
controlling NGOs, and monitoring the public.
In summary, the WHO can gather further information about a possible
PHEIC either through official notification from the State Party (Articles 6-8), or through unofficial channels, such as social media or whistle
blowers (Article 9). Then, will the WHO immediately announce the information to all State Parties and the public? How will it use the information?
These are complicated questions to answer. It would set an undesirable
precedent for the WHO to release all the reports immediately when some
could turn out to be false alarms. The negative impact on trade and national image associated with the WHO announcement would be devastating and irreversible for the reporting State Party. No State Party would
have an incentive to comply with the IHR in future health crisis. In addition, false alarms would damage the WHO's reputation as the trusted
guardian of global health. Within their constraints, the IHR walks a fine
line between encouraging the State Party at issue to immediately report its
material information to the WHO and avoiding being perceived as handling the information at the expense of the reporting Party while striving
to protect global health. Thus, it is understandable that Article 11 devotes
several subsections to vacillating between the no-release-without-consent
principle and exceptions to it.
As a principle, Article 11(2) requires the WHO to use the information
it receives "for verification, assessment and assistance purposes." 148 Without the consent from the reporting State Party, the WHO is not permitted
to "make this information generally available to other States [sic]

144
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Parties." 149 However, the subsections lay out several exceptions to the norelease-without-consent principle: (a) when the DG has determined that
the reported event constitutes a PHEIC; (b) when the WHO has confirmed
that the reported event causes the international spread of an infection or
contamination; (c) when because of the nature of the event, the measures
to control the situation can only be successful with the release of the information; (d) when the reporting State Party is incapable of carrying out
necessary measures to bring the spread under control; or (e) when the
magnitude of the infection or contamination warrants the release of the
information to avert serious damage to international trade and travel. If
one of the exceptions apply, the WHO may share the reported information
with other State Parties. If the information has already become publicly
available, the WHO may release it to the public as well. 15 0
How will the WHO use the information? The IHR obligate the WHO
to collaborate with the State Party in assessing whether the event can
spread widely, causing interruption of international traffic, and whether
the measures that have been taken are adequate to control the event. In
some situations, the State Party and the WHO are incapable of controlling
the potential spread without enlisting international assistance. However,
not every State Party welcomes such assistance because the unwanted international attention can cause negative publicity and produce a stigmatizing effect. To preserve the State Party's incentive for cooperation, Article 10(3) of the IHR conditions the WHO's offer of assistance upon the
State Party's request. In other words, the State Party can choose to reject
the WHO's support.
The IHR does provide an option for the WHO to intervene if the State
Party refuses international assistance. Article 10(4) permits the WHO to
share information with other State Parties if the event poses serious public
health risk. The conundrum is that without the opportunity to enter the
affected area and provide assistance, the WHO is unable to follow the situation in real time. Thus, even with the option to inform other State Parties, in such a case the WHO simply has nothing further to share. For example, in 2007, Indonesia health officials refused to share H5N1 bird flu
samples with the WHO, which substantially diminished the organization's
capacity to monitor the virus's mutations.15 1 The Indonesian government
said that it withheld the samples to extract a concession from the WHO,
that it would provide affordable vaccines to the country.1 52
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The PHEICDetermination
After receiving the reports from a State Party (or from other sources),
the most important step the WHO will take is to determine whether the
reported event constitutes a PHEIC. A PHEIC is "an extraordinary event
which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a
public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response." 15 3 The IHR provides two ways for the DG to initiate the procedure for the PHEIC determination according to Article 49.154 First, if the
DG has reached a preliminary conclusion based on the IHR criteria that a
PHEIC is occurring, the DG will consult with the State Party to seek their
agreement about the preliminary determination. With the State Party's
consent, the DG will convene the Emergency Committee to review the
information regarding the event according to the procedures set forth in
Article 49. If the DG and the State Party fail to reach an agreement within
forty-eight hours, the DG will activate the Article 49 procedure. The DG
plays a crucial role in reaching a preliminary decision, negotiating with
the State Party, and initiating the Article 49 procedure.
The Emergency Committee
After receiving the information from the State Party, and if the DG
believes that a PHEIC is occurring, the DG will select experts from the
IHR's expert roster155 and form an Emergency Committee ("EC"). 156 The
DG will then set the agenda for the EC meeting and provide it with the
information on the event gathered from the State Party and the DG's temporary recommendation. During the EC meeting, the State Party at issue
is given a chance to present its view of the situation, but it does not have
the right to postpone the process. After the deliberation, the EC will present its assessment and recommendations to the DG, who will make the
final decision on whether the reported event constitutes a PHEIC. Then,
the DG will inform the State Parties of his or her final decision, including
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155 Id. at art. 48(2).
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recommendations the DG puts together with the views of the EC. This
occurs before the information is made available to the public.
In determining whether an event constitutes a PHEIC, the DG considers the following factors: 157
(a) information provided by the State Party;
(b) the decision instrument contained in Annex 2 [the
Four-Factor Test];
(c) the advice of the Emergency Committee;
(d) scientific principles as well as the available scientific
evidence and other relevant information; and
(e) an assessment of the risk to human health, of the risk
of international spread of disease and of the risk of interference with international traffic.
If the DG has determined that a PHEIC has occurred, he or she will
issue temporary recommendations to prevent or reduce the spread of the
disease from the State Party at issue to other countries. Depending on the
nature of the emergency, the temporary recommendations may include
health measures that will have substantial impact on international travel
and trade. 158
Relationship Between IHR and NationalHealth Measures
The IHR does not preclude State Parties from taking health measures
based on their own national health laws if the measures can "achieve the
same or greater level of health protection than WHO recommendations."1 5 9 The national measures should "not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of
health protection."1 60
Under Article 43 of the IHR, States Parties implementing additional
health measures that significantly interfere with international traffic (refusal of entry or departure of international travelers, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, for more than
twenty-four hours) are obliged to send to WHO the public health rationale
and justification within forty-eight hours of their implementation. WHO
will review the justification and may ask countries to reconsider their
measures. WHO is required to share with other State Parties the information about measures and the justification received. 161
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The WHO's Delayed PHEIC DeclarationDuring the COVID-19 Pandemic
On December 30, 2019, Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at the
WCH, sent a picture of a lab report to a group of friends through WeChat,
the most popular social media platform in China. 162 He wrote "Seven
SARS cases have been confirmed. All the cases have connections with the
Huanan Fruit and Seafood Market. The patients are treated in isolation at
the WCH's Houhu campus." 16 3 Four days later, the police arrested Dr. Li,
along with seven other doctors, for spreading false information and disturbing the social order.1 64 The police issued an official warning that Dr.
Li would face serious criminal penalties if he refused to cooperate with
the police. 165
On December 31, 2019, WHO's Country Office in China noticed a
"media statement by the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission from their
website on cases of 'viral pneumonia' in Wuhan."1 66 It immediately
alerted WHO's IHR Focal Point in the West Pacific Regional Office of the
development. On the same day, WHO's Epidemic Intelligence from Open
Sources ("EIOS") platform was alarmed by a media report on ProMED
hosted by the International Society for Infectious Diseases about the same
cluster of unknown pneumonia cases found in Wuhan.1 67 The Country Office alerted the IHR Focal Point in the WHO Western Pacific Regional
Office of the new development.1 68
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On January 1, 2020, the WHO asked the Chinese health authorities to
explain the reported cluster of atypical pneumonia cases.1 69 The Chinese
government confirmed the report on January 3, 2020170 The United States
CDC received the information about the outbreak on the same day.' 7 ' The
WHO claimed that it shared the information through Event Information
System on January 5, 2020, but that the system was inaccessible to the
public.1 72
On January 22, 2020, a day before the lockdown in Wuhan, the DG
called the first EC meeting to discuss whether the WHO should declare
the event a PHEIC.1 73 By that time, the number of cases had increased to
557, and the virus had been identified in other countries, including Japan,
Thailand, and Korea. 174 The Committee warned that "cases may appear in
any [other] countries."1 The EC urged China to "provide more information on cross-government risk management measures" and to "continue
to share full data on all cases." 176 The committee did not advise the DG to
declare the event a PHEIC. It reasoned:
In the face of an evolving epidemiological situation and
the restrictive binary nature of declaring a PHEIC or not,
WHO should consider a more nuanced system, which
would allow an intermediate level of alert. Such a system
would better reflect the severity of an outbreak, its impact, and the required measures, and would facilitate improved international coordination, including research efforts for developing medical counter measures.1 77
On January 30, 2020, the DG called the second EC meeting in Geneva. 178 The Committee lauded China for "the leadership and political
16 9

Id.
Id.

'7' Rebecca Ballhaus & Stephanie Armour, Health Chief's Early Missteps
Set Back CoronavirusResponse, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020),
https :1/ vw .wsi co/artile s/health-chiefs-early-missteips-set-back-coronavirusresponse-11587570514.
172 Listings of WHO's response to COVID-19, WHO (Dec. 28, 2020),

https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline.
173 Statement on the first meeting of the InternationalHealth Regulations
(2005) Emergency Committee regardingthe outbreak of novel coronavirus
(2019-nCoV), WHO (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/iten/23-01-

2020-statement-on-the-mectin -of-the-intematonial-health-rep lations-42005)emergencv-committee-regarding the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavius®(20 19®
ncov).
4 Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
18 Statement on the second meeting of the InternationalHealth Regulations
(2005) Emergency Committee regardingthe outbreak of novel coronavirus
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commitment of the very highest levels of Chinese government, their commitment to transparency, and the efforts made to investigate and contain
the current outbreak." 1 7 9 The Committee believed it was "still possible to
interrupt virus spread, provided that countries put in place strong measures
to detect disease early, isolate and treat cases, trace contacts, and promote
social distancing measures commensurate with the risk." 1 80 At the end of
the report, the Committee recommended that the DG declare a PHEIC. In
reaching this conclusion, the Committee sounded profusely apologetic by
characterizing the declaration as being "in the spirit of support and appreciation for China, its people, and the actions China has taken on the front
lines of this outbreak." 18 1 On the same day, the DG officially declared the
outbreak of the coronavirus in China a PHEIC after he praised China for
its commitment to transparency.1 8 2
II. THE WHO'S DELAYED RESPONSE NOT A CAUSE FOR THE
DEVASTATING RESULTS IN THE UNITED STATES

While the WHO's delay in declaring the outbreak of the coronavirus
in Wuhan a PHEIC is indefensible, the U.S. government's response to the
pandemic has also been extremely reckless. To deflect from the criticism
of his handling of the health crisis, President Trump blamed the WHO for
conceding to China and causing the United States to miss the early signs
of the pandemic. After cutting funding for the WHO, the Trump Administration declared in July 2020 that the United States would withdraw from
WHO membership. 183 The withdrawal declaration instantly prompted a
backlash from U.S. public health experts and law professors, who claimed

(2019-nCoV), WHO (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/ite 30-012020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations(2005)-emergency-coimnittee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-

(2019-ncov).
179 Id.
180

181

Id.
Id.

182 Director-General'sstatement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus(2019-nCoV), WHO (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who -director-general-s-statement-on-ihr-emergency-

committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov).
183 Scott Neuman, In U.N. Speech, Trump Blasts ChinaAnd WHO, Blaming
Them For Spread Of COVID-19, NPR (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://wvw. npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/09/22/915630892/in-u-n-speech-trump-blasts-china-and-who-blaming-them-for-spread-of-covid-19; Thomas J. Bollyky & Jeremy Konyndyk, It's
not the WHO's fault that Trump didn t preparefor the coronavirus,WASH. POST
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/14/trumpwho-coronavirus-response/; Donald G. McNeil Jr. & Andrew Jacobs, Blaming
Chinafor Pandemic, Trump Says U.S. Will Leave the WHO., N.Y T1MES (May
29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/health/virus-who.html.
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the move was not only unconstitutional but could also threaten the health
and security of Americans. Scholars argued that the health and safety of
Americans depends on whether the global health can be well maintained
because viruses know no borders. 184
The United States has the highest per capita expenditure on health care
in the world. 185 Equipped with the most advance technology and expertise, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC") set gold standards for creating tests and designing therapeutics
in the previous pandemics. After the 2012 outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome ("MERS"), the CDC helped developing nations "improve disease surveillance, build better laboratories and train epidemiologists."1 86 When the WHO declared an outbreak of the novel coronavirus
as a public health emergency of international concern on January 31, 2020,
health experts perceived the United States to be the most prepared nation
in the world-one that did not need any assistance. 187 This aura of invincibility also grew among the President and his public health officials as
they watched the virus spreading rapidly in China and other countries.
When the reality set in by early March 2020, the American public and
medical professionals quickly came to terms with the fact that the U.S.
healthcare system was not as prepared for the pandemic as those of other
developing countries. As of this writing, 16% of the 3.7 million world's
total COVID-19 related deaths occurred in the United States, which has
only 4% of the world's population.1 88 The United States disproportionally
bears the impact of the pandemic.

184 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Letter to Congress on WHO Withdrawal
from
PublicHealth, Law and InternationalRelations Leaders, O'NEILL INST. FOR
NAT'L & GLOB. HEALTH L. (June 30, 2020),
https://oneill.law. georgetown. edu/letter-to-congress-on-who-withdrawal-frompublic-health-law-and-international-relations-leaders/.
185 Rabah Kamal et al., How does health spending in the U.S. compare to
other countries?, HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 23, 2020),

https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-comDare-countrie s/#item-start.
186 Betsy McKay & Phred Dvorak, A Deadly CoronavirusWas Inevitable.
Why Was No One Ready?, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2020),
htps://www.wsi .com/articles/a-deadlv-coronavirus-was-inevitable-why-was-noone-ready-for-covid-11597325213.
187 Betsy McKay, How CoronavirusOverpoweredthe World Health Organization, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2020), hps://www.wsi.com/articles/the-whowas-built-to-guard-global-health-it-was-too-weak-for-coronavirus11598625537.
188 CoronavirusResearch Center, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/ (last visited June 5, 2021). See also Scottie Andrew, The US has
4% of the world's population but 25% of its coronaviruscases, CNN (June 30,
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/30/health/us-coronavirus-toll-in-numbers-

iune-tmd/index.html.
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On January 3, 2020, the U.S. CDC alerted Mr. Alex Azar, the secretary
of the Health and Human Services ("HHS") of the coronavirus threat. 189
On January 20, 2020, three days before the Wuhan lockdown, 190 the CDC
identified the first COVID-19 case in the State of Washington. 19 1 In the
United States, as of this writing, there are 33 million confirmed COVID19 cases and nearly 600,000 deaths attributed to this devastating virus. 192
The WHO's delayed action was not a factual cause of the devastating consequences experienced in the United States. 193
Even if the WHO had declared the virus a PHEIC at an earlier stage,
President Trump would not have heeded the warning nor taken effective
measures to mitigate the pandemic. On January 29, 2020, Peter Navarro,
President Trump's economic advisor, warned his colleagues in the White
House that "the novel coronavirus could take more than half a million
American lives and cost close to six trillion dollars."1 94 On February 23,
Peter Navarro again alerted the President to the devastating consequences
of the virus: "There is an increasing probability of a full-blown COVID19 pandemic that could infect as many as 100 million Americans, with a
loss of life of as many as 1-2 million souls."1 95 Despite the urgent warnings, President Trump deliberately downplayed the severity of the pandemic and falsely claimed it to be comparable to the flu. 196

Ballhaus & Armour, supra note 171,
Wuhan coronavirus:From silent streets to packed pools, BBC
(Aug. 18,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53816511.
191 See Jennifer Harcourt et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus 2 from Patientwith CoronavirusDisease, United States, CDC (June,
2020), https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2606.200516; Coronavirusoutbreak: doctors use robot to treatfirst known US patient, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/ian/22/coronavirus-doctors-use-robot-to-treat-first-known-us-patient; see also Nicole Chavez & Nadia Kounang,
A man diagnosed with Wuhan coronavirusnear Seattle is being treatedlargely
by a robot, CNN (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/health/uswuhan-coronavirus-doctor-interview/index. html.
192 CoronavirusResearch Center, supra
note 188.
189
190

193 VINCENT JOHN & CHENGLIN

Liu,

STUDIES OF AMERICAN TORTS LAW

410 (6 th ed. 2018) ("... the issue of causation involves a two-step inquiry. The
first step asks whether in fact there was a connection between the allegedly tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury. One way (but not the only way) to meet
this requirement is to show that 'but for' the defendant's conduct the harm
would not have occurred.").
194 Jonathan Swan & Margaret Talev, Navarro memos warning of mass
coronavirusdeath circulatedin January, AmoS MEDIA (Apr. 7, 2020),

htts ://www.axios.com/exclusive -navarro-deaths-coronavirus-memos-januarvda3f08fb-dce
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During an interview with Bob Woodward, the President revealed:
".
. [S]ome startling facts came out. It's not just old,
older, young people too, plenty of young people [who are
vulnerable to the disease]..." 197 "I wanted to always play
it down, I still like playing it down because I don't want
to create a panic.""I wanted to always play it down, I still
like playing it down because I don't want to create a
panic." 198
President Trump's top priority then was on how to get reelected, not
on seriously fighting the virus. The President worried that openly admitting to the existence of a pandemic would send the stock market to a free
fall, which would hurt his job performance ratings. In addition, the President initially did not want to irritate China, which had just reluctantly
agreed to purchase farm products in a trade deal. Mr. Trump viewed the
trade deal as his signature accomplishment that he heavily relied on for
his reelection. 199 He feared that pressing China for cooperation on the pandemic could cause it not to honor the trade deal. 200
The President's cavalier attitude toward the pandemic permeated the
administration and exerted deep influence on his supporters and the general public. 20 1 The disregard of science, infectious disease experts, and
even the daily tally of confirmed COVID-19 cases, greatly undermined
any effort to contain the pandemic. 202 For example, when Dr. Robert Redfield, director of the CDC, recommended that people wear masks or face
coverings in the public, the President said he would not do so. 203
https://www. nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-compares-covid-flu-experts-say-he-s-flat-wrong-n1242258.
19
7 Aishvarya Kavi, 5 Takeaways From 'Rage, 'Bob Woodward's New Book
About Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/politics/woodward-trump-rage-takeaways.html.
19 8

Id.

Christina Wilkie, Trump Pulls PunchesAnd Clings To His China Trade
DealAs Backlash Against Beijing Grows, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2020),
199

hts://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/24/coronavirus-trump-clings-to-china-tmdedeal-as-beijing-backlash-grows.html.
200 Id.
201 Ashley Parker et al., How Trump 's erratic behavior andfailure
on coronavirus doomed his reelection, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost. com/elections/interactive/2020/trump-pandemic-coronavirus-election/.
202 Libby Cathey, With string of attacks on doctors and experts, Trump
takes aim at science: analysis, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/string-attacks-doctors-experts-trump-takes-aimscience/storv?id=72170408.
203 See Colin Dwyer & Allison Aubrey, CDC Now Recommends Americans
Consider Wearing Cloth Face CoveringsIn Public, NPR (Apr. 3, 2020),

https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
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Undermining his own medical experts became the President's hallmark at the Coronavirus Task Force briefings. 204 During the unprecedented health crisis, it is understandable that the President was eager to
find a solution. 205 However, from suggesting the injection of disinfectants
to promoting the use of unproven therapeutics, such as antimalarial drug
hydroxychloroquine, as treatments of the coronavirus, 206 the President
emboldened his political base to resist scientifically proven mitigation
measures. 207
Further, to sideline Dr. Anthony Fauci, who was unwilling to support
the President's baseless claims, President Trump added Dr. Scott Atlas, a
neuroradiologist and a Fox News commentator, to the Coronavirus Task
Force. 208 Immediately upon his appointment, Dr. Atlas made it his priority
to dismiss the effectiveness of wearing masks and social distancing
measures, both of which he blamed for disrupting businesses and the economy. 209 Moreover, he embraced the controversial theory of "herd immunity," which could be achieved by encouraging young and healthy people
to be exposed to the virus.2 10 Furthermore, Dr. Atlas called for people in

updates/2020/04/03/826219824/president-trump-says-cdc-now-recommendsamericans-wear-cloth-masks-n-public.
204 See Kevin Liptak & Nick Valencia, Trump now in open dispute
with
health officials as virus rages, CNN (July 8, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/08/politics/trump-fauci-cdc-redfield-expertscoronavirus/index.html.
205 See Jennifer Jacobs & Drew Armstrong, Trump 's "Operation Warp
Speed" Aims to Rush Coronavirus Vaccine, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-29/trump-s-operation-warpspeed-aims-to-rush-coronavirus-vaccine.
206 See Nicholas Wu & John Fritze, From malariadrugs to disinfectant:
Here are some of Trump 's claims about the coronavirus, USA TODAY (Apr. 24,
2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/24/coronavirustrumps-claims-chloroquine-disinfectant-draw-rebukes/3018924001/.
207 See Allyson Chiu et al., Trump claims controversialcomment about injecting disinfectants was "sarcastic", WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/04/24/disinfectant-injection-coronavirus-trump/.
208 See Jill Colvin, Meet ScottAtlas, Trump's new doctor on the coronavirus
taskforce, a Fox News regularwho happens to agree with the president on the
pandemic, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-nw-trump-scott-atlas-coronavirus-20200816-

kp5mmxr2ibfgpquppxtb3kko4-story.html.
209 See Nancy Cook, Trump elevates ScottAtlas, a doctor with a rosier
coronavirusoutlook, POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/17/trump-scott-atlas-coronavirus-doctor-3 96741.
210 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House embracesa declarationfrom scientists that opposes lockdowns and relies on "herdimmunity", N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/world/white-house-embraces-
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Michigan to "rise up" against the COVID-19 restrictions Governor
Whitmer imposed to combat the resurgence of new cases.2 11
President Trump's reckless attitude and approach toward the coronavirus proved to be contagious. For example, in the early stages of the pandemic and despite strong recommendation from health officials such as
Dr. Fauci, the President downplayed the effectiveness of the use of masks
in combatting the spread of the coronavirus.m Many Republican leaders
followed the President's lead, refusing to wear masks or socially distance,
despite increases in coronavirus cases. 213 In fact, Senator Rand Paul, while
waiting for his coronavirus test results, used the gym at Capitol Hill and
attended group lunches with colleagues. 2 14 He was the first senator to test
positive for the coronavirus.2 15 Dan Patrick, the Republican lieutenant
governor of Texas, uttered the most blunt argument for resisting the restrictive measures: "There are more important things than living, and
that's saving this country." 2 16
In early July, shortly after the President held a campaign rally in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, the state experienced a drastic surge in coronavirus cases.2
Tulsa Health Department officials attributed the surge to the rally, where

a-declaration-from-scientists-that-opposes-lockdowns-and-relies-on-herd-immunity. html.
211
212

Id.

215

See Phil Mattingly et al., Rand Paul isfirst senatorto test positive for

See Daniel Victor et al., In His Own Words, Trump on the Coronavirus
and Masks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/politics/donald-trump-masks.html.
213 See Andrew DeMillo, Many GOP lawmakers shrug off Statehouse maskwearingrules, ABC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/gop-lawmakers-shrug-off-statehouse-mask-wearing-rules74335643.
214 See Sen. Paul, Why I didn 'tquarantine aftergetting tested, USA TODAY
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/stoiy/opinion/todaysdebate/2020/03/24/rand-paul-why-no-quarantine-after-getting-tested-editorials-debates/2912183001/; see also Edward-Isaac Dovere, Rand Paul Has More
Than a Cold, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/03/rand-paul-coronavirus-test-reckless/608593/ ("The senator
from Kentucky was worried enough to get tested. But while he waited for the
results, he kept going to work, the gym, and the pool.").
coronavirus, CNN (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/22/politics/rand-paul-coronavirus/index.html.
216 Alex Samuels, Dan Patrick Says "There are More Important Things
Than Living and that's Saving this Country", TEX. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 21, 2020),

https://www.tpr.org/texas/2020-04-21/dan-patrick-says-there-are-more-important-things-than-living-and-thats-saving-this-country.
217 Maggie Astor & Noah Weiland, CoronavirusSurge in Tulsa "More Than
Likely" Linked to Trump Rally, N.Y TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/politics/coronavirus-tulsa-trunp-rally.html.
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most attendees did not wear masks. 2 18 Herman Cain, a staunch ally of the
President, died of coronavirus after attending the rally.2 19
The negative consequences of the President's reckless attitude were
not limited to his political followers. The President himself, along with
White House staff, allies, and campaign staff, contracted the coronavirus
one after another.220 Tellingly, Senator Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, refused to go to the White House due to its lack of appropriate safeguards to protect against the spread of coronavirus.22 1
Science Drowned Out by Misinformation...
On January 29, 2020, the WHO recommended the use of medical
masks in communities, homes, and health care facilities to prevent the
spread of the coronavirus. 22 3 In March 2020, the WHO joined forces with
the government of the United Kingdom to launch a global campaign to
fight against misinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. 224 It
also collaborated with 40 tech companies to stem the spread of false

2 18

See id.

219

Aimee Ortiz & Katharine Q. Seelye, Herman Cain, Former C.E.O. and
PresidentialCandidate, Dies at 74, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/us/politics/hennan-cain-dead.html.
22 0
Oma Seddiq & Sawyer Click, We made a graphicto show just how bad
the COVID-19 outbreaks in Trump's circle are, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider. com/org-chart-white-house-coronavirus-trump-inner-circle-2020-11.
22 1
Dominic Torres & Clare Foran, McConnell says he hasn 't been to White
House since August, citing COVID-19protocols, CNN (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/08/politics/mcconnell-white-house-coronavirus/index.html.
222 See Doctors, Nurses Face Harassment, Firingfor Self-Care Amid
COVID-19 Coronavirus, MEDICINENET (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekev=229571.
223
Advice on the use of masks in the community, during home care and in
health care settings in the context of the novel coronavirus(2019-nCoV) outbreak, WORLD HEALm ORG. (Jan. 30, 2020) https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/330987/WHO-nCov-IPC Masks-2020.1-

eng.pdf?seciuence= 1&isAllowed=y.
224 Counteringmisinformationabout COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/countering-misinformation-about-covid-19.
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which undermined the response ef-

forts.226

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the CDC was quickly relegated to
an insignificant role in the pandemic response due to political pressure
from the Trump Administration.22 7 The flood of misinformation rendered
the CDC powerless in delivering science-based messages to the public.
This is a stark contrast to the crucial role that the CDC historically played
during the previous health crises. 22 8 For example, in dealing with the
Ebola cases in 2014, the CDC took a lead role conducting new routine
briefings and instituting effective measures to prevent the further spread
of the virus in the United States and in the world. 22 9
In late February of 2020, leading experts at the CDC and NIH came
to consensus that "the coronavirus was most likely spreading silently."2 30
On February 25, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, director of the National Center
for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases at the CDC, warned that the
American public should "prepare for the expectation that this is going to
be bad." 23 1 She predicted that community spread of the virus was inevitable.232 Upon the public announcement, the stock market plunged more
than 3%.233 When President Trump learned about the news on the way
225 Malaka Gharbie, WHO Is FightingFalse COVID Info on Social Media.

How 's That Going?, NPR (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/02/09/963 973675/who-is-fighting-false-covid-info-onsocial-media-hows-that-going.
226 Immunizing the public againstmisinformation, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
(Aug. 25 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/immunizing-the-public-against-misinformation.
227 See Oliver Milman, Where is the CDC? How Trump Sidelined the Public
HealthAgency in a Pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (May 14, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/14/where-is-the-cdc-trumpcovid-19-pandemic; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump AdministrationStrips C.D. C.
of Control of CoronavirusData, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html.
228 Rebecca Ballhaus et al., A Demoralized CDC Grappleswith White
House Meddling and its Own Mistakes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-demoralized-cdc-grapples-with-white-housemeddling-and-its-own-mistakes-11602776561.
22
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Id.

Aylin Woodward, A New Documentary Shows How a Top CDC Official
Who WarnedAmericansAbout the CoronavirusPromptly Vanishedfrom Public
View, Bus. Insider (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/cdc-official-warned-us-coronavirus-was-silenced-documentary-2020-10.
231

See Pippa Stevens, Trump is Reportedly Furiousthat the Stock Market is

Plungingon CoronavirusFears, CNBC NEWS (Feb. 25, 2020),
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back from India, he immediately called Alex Azar and asked, 23 4 "Did you
know Nancy Messonnier had scared the sh-out of people?"23 5 The President, who often took credit for the stock market's rise, 2 36 threatened to
fire Dr. Messonnier.237
The next day, President Trump replaced Secretary Alex Azar with
Vice President Mike Pence to lead the White House Coronavirus Task
Force. 238 One of the first steps that the Vice President took was to control
the "messaging" around the virus. 2 39 He required that top health officials
seek clearance before making any public statement about the virus. 240 The
restriction was intended not only to prevent Dr. Messonnier from speaking
again, but also to muzzle Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ("NIAID"), who publicly called
out the President's baseless claims about the virus. 24 1 Previously, Dr.
Fauci had predicted that it might be impossible to contain the virus while
the President claimed that the coronavirus would disappear by summer.24 2
Political interference also forced the CDC to align its guidelines and
reports with the President and his party's misperception of the pandemic. 243 Michael Caputo, the assistant secretary of HHS for Public

234
23 5

Woodward, supra note 230.
Id.

William Cummings, Trump Has Often Taken Creditfor the Stock Market's Climb. Will He Own the Drops Too?, USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/02/05/trumpstock-market-credit/308627002/.
237 Woodward, supra note
230.
238 On January 29, President Trump announced the formation the
Coronavirus Task Force, which consisted of Secretary Alex Azar, Department of Health
and Human Services; Robert O'Brien, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs; Dr. Robert Redfield, Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health, and official for
other parts of the government. Alex Azar was the head of the Task Force. See
Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President's
Coronavirus Task Force (Jan. 29, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives. gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidentscoronavirus-task-force/.
239 Tom Porter, Trump AdministrationBriefly Barreda Top US DiseaseExpertfrom Speaking Freely to the PublicAfter He Warned the CoronavirusMight
Be Impossible to Contain, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-anthonM-fauci-trump-admin-stops-discussion2020-2.
240 Id.
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Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDCReports on COVID19, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809.
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Affairs, played a key role in overriding CDC scientists' professional judgments. 244 As a political operative for the Trump campaign, Caputo had no
background in either science or medicine. 245 It was his loyalty to the President and the party that put him at the top of the HHS leadership. 246 During
a Facebook live event, Caputo accused CDC scientists of "sedition" because they undermined President Trump by emphasizing the severity of
the pandemic. 247
CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report ("MMWR") Series is
a world-renowned scientific journal that provides healthcare professionals
and academics with "timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective,
and useful public health information and recommendations." 248 Health
professionals often regard the journal as "the voice of CDC." 24 9 Soon after
being appointed at the HHS in April 2020, Caputo aggressively targeted
the MMWR because he viewed the journal as a platform for the "deep
state" scientists to undercut the President's optimism about coronavirus. 250 He brought his own science advisor, Paul Alexander, who was a
part-time faculty member at Macmaster University in Canada specializing
in research methods.2 51 He demanded that all future MMWR reports be
subject to his review and revision before publication.2 52 In addition, he
requested retroactive revision of journal articles that were deemed inconsistent with the President's view of the pandemic.2 53
While CDC officials resisted the political interference, they did allow
Alexander to review the reports, revise the wording, and delay publication
on occasion. 4 In one example of this review process, the CDC held back
the report on the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine, an anti-malarial
drug vigorously promoted by President Trump as a cure to the
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pandemic. 25 5 The belated report showed that "the potential benefits of
these drugs [hydroxychloroquine] do not outweigh their risks." 256 In June,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) retracted the emergency
COVID-19 use approval for hydroxychloroquine because it did not find
the malarial drug was effective in treating the coronavirus. 2 5 7Alexander
accused the CDC scientists of using the MMWR report to undermine the
President's credibility. 2 58
On March 10, 2020, a superspreading event took place during a
church choir practice in Skagit Country, Washington, where one symptomatic person infected 53 members, 87% of the 61 members who were in
attendance. 259 Of the three choir members who were hospitalized, two
died.2 60 On May 12, the CDC reported the incident in an MMWR article,
which claimed that "[t]he act of singing, itself, might have contributed to
transmission through emission of aerosols, which is affected by loudness
of vocalization." 2 61 When the CDC used the same claim in its initial
guidelines for reopening houses of worship, 262 White House officials
summoned Dr. Redfield to go over the guidelines line-by-line with
them. 263 The final version of the guidelines eliminated the language involving the aerosols created by singing. 264
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In the same way, the CDC softened warnings and restrictions in the
guidelines for reopening schools. 265 In late June, a superspreading incident took place at a youth summer camp in Georgia, where more than half
of the 597 camp attendees were infected with COVID-19. 2 66 The median
age of 346 campers was 12; the median age of 251 staff members was
17.267 The attendees, who tested negative before entering the site, engaged
in indoor activities including frequent singing and cheering without social
distancing or masks. 268 The MMWR report concluded "that SARS-CoV2 spread efficiently in a youth-centric overnight setting, resulting in high
attack rates among persons in all age groups, despite efforts by camp officials to implement most recommended strategies to prevent transmission." 269 As the data on the transmission of coronavirus among youths
were limited, the summer camp outbreak offered useful lessons for school
safety during the pandemic. 270 However, Paul Alexander accused scientists of exaggerating the risk of COVID-19 among children to undermine
President Trump's push to reopen schools. 27 1 He further claimed that the
"CDC tried to report as if once kids get together, there will be spread and
this will impact school re-opening . . . . Very misleading by CDC and
shame on them. Their aim is clear." 272 Under pressure, Dr. Redfield agreed
to postpone publication of the report to avoid direct conflict with President
Trump. 2 73 Fully appreciating the damage to the CDC, Dr. Redfield ordered a staff member to delete Paul Alexander's emails. 27 4
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HospitalInfections
In 2016, the WHO issued a guideline on infection prevention and control in healthcare facilities. 27 5 It specifically urged hospitals to keep adequate personal protection equipment ("PPE") and maintain isolation facilities to prevent cross infection. 2 76 In March 2020, the WHO issued a stern
warning to State Parties that they would be putting lives at risk if they
could not provide frontline health workers with adequate PPE.277 In another warning, the DG pleaded for countries to act quickly because "[n]o
country, hospital or clinic can keep its patients safe unless it keeps its
health workers safe." 278 Without an effective enforcement mechanism,
however, the WHO guidelines and warnings are often ignored in practice.
Due to hospitals' recklessness and shortage of PPE, American medical
workers were vulnerable to the coronavirus. 27 9 By June 2020, nearly
75,000 health care workers had contracted the coronavirus. 280 Numerous
doctors and nurses have left the profession under enormous stress of the
pandemic. 28 1 According to a Nurse Union report, "More than 1,700
healthcare workers have died of COVID-19 since the pandemic began." 2 82
As a result, more than 20% of hospitals have reported shortages of medical
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staff.28 3 Even though the pandemic plan drafted by the Bush Administration required the federal government to maintain the strategic national
stockpile ("SNS") of PPE and other medical devices, there was no legal
mandate to replenish the stockpile after it became deflated. During the
2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, the SNS made "the largest deployment [of PPE]
in the SNS history." 2 84 Once the crisis was over, Congress did not appropriate funds to refill the stockpile because it was no longer on a budgetary
priority.28 5 The Trump Administration had no choice but to push states to
acquire PPEs on their own. 286
Furthermore, American medical workers and health administrators
face similar challenges when they speak up about the virus. 28 7 In March
2020, Tonya Randolph, a nurse, discovered that her employment contract
was terminated prematurely by the Lake Granbury Medical Center
("LGMC") in Dallas, Texas simply because she wore facemasks during
her rounds. 2 88 Like the Wuhan Central Hospital, LGMC was concerned
that allowing medical workers to wear masks at work would cause public
panic and hurt profit. 289 Ms. Randolph recounted her experience at the
LGMC saying, "I was told very angrily that I needed to take my mask off
immediately." 290
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Dr. Henry Nickicicz, an anesthesiologist at the University Medical
Center in El Paso, Texas, nearly lost his job after being caught wearing a
respirator facemask in the hospital's hallway. 291 His supervisor blamed
him for overreacting to the virus and causing panic by wearing his
mask. 292 Dr. Nickicicz was suspended from work after he argued that his
age and physical condition made him vulnerable to the coronavirus.293
Only after media intervention, did the hospital reinstate Dr. Nickicicz and
allow him to wear masks. 294
Dr. Ming Lin, an emergency doctor at PeaceHealth St. Joseph Medical
Center ("PeaceHealth"), Washington, was fired for criticizing the hospital's inaction in preventing the spread of the coronavirus. 295 Asked about
why he decided to voice his concerns, he replied: "I do fear for my staff
. . Morally, when you see something wrong, I think you have to speak
out." 296 In response to PeaceHealth's decision to fire Dr. Lin, the spokeswoman for the Washington Nurses Association stated, "Hospitals are muzzling nurses and other health-care workers in an attempt to preserve their
image [...] it's outrageous." 297
The CDC 's Test Failures
On January 17, 2020, the WHO issued a guideline for laboratory testing of the novel coronavirus and published a protocol created by German
researchers for countries to construct their own coronavirus tests.298 By
February 5, 2020, the WHO had "shipped 250,000 tests to more than 70
laboratories around the world" and trained their lab workers on how to use
them. 299 Knowing that the United States is always self-sufficient for
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diagnostics, the WHO distributed the tests exclusively among middle or
low-income countries. Instead of following the WHO protocols, the CDC
decided to create its own tests, which ended disastrously. 300
The CDC maintained a track record in developing pathogenic tests for
state and local public health laboratories during previous health crises. 301
On January 7, 2020, Dr. Stephen Lindstrom and his team at the CDC
planned to create a test for the coronavirus. 30 2 Dr. Lindstrom was the right
choice for this task because he and his team overcame technical and regulatory obstacles to create a test within two weeks during the 2009 HIN1
pandemic. 303 In addition, Dr. Lindstrom had a sense of urgency that was
lacking among the CDC leadership at the time. 304
Dr. Lindstrom did succeed in creating the test at the CDC with which
the first U.S. COVID-19 case was confirmed on January 20, 2020.305
However, the test could only be used at the CDC's lab in Atlanta. Because
of this technicality, states had to send specimens to the CDC for testing,
which made the capacity of the CDC lab extremely limited. 306 Therefore,
to enable public health labs to perform tests locally, Dr. Lindstrom created
a three-prong test kit, which received an Emergency Use Authorization
("EUA") from the FDA on February 4.307 Four days later, state and local
health officials discovered that the CDC test kits produced inaccurate results. 30 8 Subsequent investigation revealed that the third prong of the test
kits might have been contaminated due to either design defects or manufacturing defects. 30 9 The CDC was not able to repair the faulty test kits
until February 29.310
While the CDC was struggling with rolling out its defective test kits,
the community transmission of the coronavirus went undetected in New
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York, Seattle, Boston and other densely populated cities.31 1 For example,
approximately 300,000 coronavirus cases worldwide were linked to a single superspreading event during an international biotech conference in
Boston in late February 2020.312 An accurate test would have enabled
health departments to take decisive actions to prevent such superspreading
events in the early stage of the outbreak.3 13 Professor Ashish Jha of the
Harvard Global Health Institute believed that accurate testing would have
made lockdowns more targeted and less disruptive to the public.3 14
Administrative Hurdlesfor Creating Tests at Labs Outside of the CDC
In addition to the CDC's failure to produce a reliable test, Secretary
Alex Azar's public health emergency order unwisely created administrative hurdles for public health labs, universities, and commercial entities to
develop their own tests.3 15 Under Section 319 of the Public Health Service
Act ("PHSA"), the HHS secretary has the authority to declare a public
health emergency if the Secretary determines "a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency . .. including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attacks." 316 Upon the declaration, the Secretary is authorized to take actions to respond to the emergency. These
actions range from mobilizing funds, materials, and health professionals
to "supportinginvestigations into the cause, treatment, or prevention of a
disease.... " 3 17 (emphasis added). However, PHSA does not specify the
measures the Secretary can take in support of finding the causes, treatment, and prevention of the disease during a health emergency.318 This
gap is filled by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA") Section 564, under which the Secretary has the power to issue an EUA for
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unapproved drugs, devices, or biological products or for unapproved use
of approved products. 319
It would appear that an emergency declaration would make it easier
for public health, academic, and commercial labs to create their own tests
because they are only required to apply for an EUA rather than formal
approval from the FDA.32 0 This is not the case, however, because these
labs are usually subject to only minimal federal regulation absent an emergency.32 1 After Secretary Azar issued a public health emergency declaration on January 31, 2020, these labs suddenly faced stricter FDA scrutiny
because they had to apply for an EUA.32 2 As a result, several prominent
labs, including the University ofWashington's clinical virology lab, could
not develop the tests in their labs because they could not get through the
bureaucratic process for an EUA application.32 3 On February 24, 2020,
the Association of Public Health Laboratories ("APHL") urged the FDA
to remove the EUA requirement for developing new pathogenic tests. 32 4
Scott Becker, chief executive of the APHL wrote, "We are now many
weeks into the response with still no diagnostic or surveillance test available outside of C.D.C. for the vast majority of our member laboratories .
.. We believe a more expeditious route is needed at this time."3 25 More
than 100 lab directors across the United States asked Congress to support
laboratory-developed tests. 32 6 Dr. Anthony Fauci also strongly advocated
for the HHS to expand testing. On February 29, 2020, the FDA finally
relaxed the requirements for the labs to conduct coronavirus tests.32 7
CONCLUSION

Based on over a century of experience in collaboration on controlling
the spread of infectious diseases, the WHO inherited its institutional structure from the International Sanitary Conferences and other international
organizations. Because there is no strong enforcement mechanism, generations of WHO leaders have been fully aware of the institution's limits
when confronting resistance from State Parties in a public health crisis.
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The asymmetry of information is greatest in the authoritarian states where
media is censured and dissidents' voices are suppressed. Even equipped
with the most sophisticated disease surveillance networks, the WHO can
still be kept in the dark when national governments withhold critical information for combating pandemics. In addition, a few states hold enormous influence over the WHO's budget and DG appointment. Because of
this, the WHO has become increasingly vulnerable to political manipulation by State Parties. The tension between the WHO and State Parties
makes the PHEIC declaration process extremely painstaking. Even though
the WHO has been a weak institution, a PHEIC declaration could substantially affect the flow of international trade and travel at the expense of
concerned State Parties. From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand why the DG spared no effort to lavish praises on China for its commitment to transparency despite the fact that they declared the spread of
coronavirus a PHEIC a full month after learning of the outbreak. In the
next crisis, there is no reason to expect that the WHO will act differently
because it can only act within its tightly constrained boundaries.
The Trump Administration's blame on WHO's inaction was misplaced. Both the WHO and the United States CDC learned of the outbreak
in Wuhan, China on January 3, 2020. While an early WHO declaration of
PHEIC could have facilitated international coordinated efforts, it was unlikely to stem the flow of trade and traffic. Several weeks after the WHO
declaration, Dr. Nancy Messonnier nearly lost her job by telling Americans that the wide spread of coronavirus was inevitable in a public statement, which sent the stock market into a free fall. It was the Trump Administration's cavalier approach to the COVID-19 pandemic, and not the
WHO's inaction, that caused the wide spread of the illness in the United
States.

